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Abstract 
  This paper studies G. A. Cohen’s account of community, in the context of 
his forceful critique of (Rawlsian) liberalism. I begin by discussing the two general 
forms of Cohen’s conception of community, justificatory community and 
communal reciprocity, contrasting them with Marx’s. I argue, first, that Cohen 
offers a compelling critique of liberalism, which successfully brings to the fore a 
difficulty liberals have making sense of, indeed attaching value to, community. I 
then argue that Cohen’s novel account of community is in deep and problematic 
tension with his own theory of justice.  Finally, I try to show, against liberals of 
most persuasions, that the second form of fraternity, which warrants the 
diminution or eradication of fear and greed from human relationships, is 
incompatible with commodification, i.e. with markets for human labor power. I 
thus try to vindicate Cohen’s view that ‘every market, even a socialist market, is a 
system of predation’. 
 
Resumé  
  Dans cet article j’étudie la conception de la fraternité dans l’œuvre de 
G.A. Cohen, dans le cadre de sa critique du libéralisme Rawlsien. Il y a deux 
formes générales de la fraternité chez Cohen: la “communauté justificative” et la 
“réciprocité communale”. Je soutiens que Cohen offre une critique convaincante 
du libéralisme, en montrant que des libéraux ont du mal à donner du sens à la 
notion de la fraternité. Puis j’essaie de montrer que la notion même de la 
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fraternité chez Cohen est en tension profonde avec sa propre théorie de justice. 
Enfin, je soutiens que la seconde forme de fraternité chez Cohen, qui justifie 
l’élimination de la peur et de l’avidité des relations humaines, est incompatible 
avec la marchandisation, autrement dit, la réciprocité communale est 
incompatible avec un marché du travail. Je donc essaie de faire valoir le point de 
vue de Cohen, selon lequel “tous les marchés, même un marché socialiste, sont 
des systèmes de prédation”. 
 
Keywords 
community, difference principle, market socialism, equality, Rawls, Marxism 
 
Mots clés 
commuanauté; égalité; principe de différence, socialisme de marché, Rawls, 
Marxisme  
 
Marx’s philosophical trajectory began, as is well known, with a “humanist” critique 
of Hegel and the Young Hegelians (with whom Marx was originally associated), 
eventually developing into a “materialist” theory of society and history.3 G. A. Cohen’s 
philosophical trajectory was, in many ways, the reverse of Marx’s: from his early 
elaboration, and defense, of historical materialism in the 1970s and 80s, Cohen gradually 
moved towards normative political philosophy, which figures prominently in all his 
writings from the 1990s until his death in 2009.  
This paper studies Cohen’s later, humanist thought.4 In particular, it focuses on an 
important but neglected strand of his thought, his account of fraternity or community.5 
Community is significant not only because it may have intrinsic value (see Wolff 1968), 
but also because it was, and remains, a significant point of difference between liberals and 
socialists, or, to the extent that liberals can be socialists, between liberals and communists. 
What I will try to do is offer a more unified account of Cohen’s views on community than 
he himself provided. One reason why it is sometimes difficult to reconstruct Cohen’s 
views into a unified set of theses has to do with the fact that most of his normative ideas 
are developed in the midst of polemic, and hence of immanent arguments. An argument 
is immanent, in my special sense, when it grants (some of) the opponent’s premises and 
derives from them conclusions she cannot accept (without intuitive cost). This way of 
                                                 
3 For excellent recent discussion of Marx’s early work see Leopold (2007) and Brudney (1998). By 
contrasting Marxian humanism and materialism I mean to assert no opposition between these two 
conceptual schemes, nor anything like an “epistemological break” in Marx’s work. On these questions I 
remain agnostic for the purposes of this essay. 
4A reevaluation of Cohen’s defense of materialism is task of epic proportions that cannot be undertaken 
here. For an attempt to reconstruct Cohen’s conception of socialism, see Vrousalis (2010). 
5Since Cohen treats “community” and “fraternity” as synonymous, I shall follow him here and use them 
interchangeably. 
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doing philosophy6 is productive, but it is also piecemeal. If you are in the business of 
testing every brick, you understandably fail to examine the overall structure. The upshot 
is that any sort of reconstruction of Cohen’s own views has to rely substantially on 
conjecture and speculation about their content and connections. 
In the first section, I sketch some parallels between Marx’s humanist thought and 
Cohen’s normative political philosophy. In the second section, I outline Cohen’s 
community critique of Rawlsian liberalism. In the third section I describe Cohen’s take 
on the connections between Rawlsian liberalism and community. In the fourth section I 
discuss the tension that arises in Cohen’s normative work between the values of justice 
and community and argue that it may well go deeper than he thought. And in the fifth 
and final section, I try to vindicate Cohen’s view that “every market, even a socialist 
market, is a system of predation” (Cohen 2009, 82), by arguing that community, as he 
understood it, requires decommodification. 
 
Marx and Cohen on Community 
 
Marx’s writings are replete with allusions to community, its forms in pre-capitalist 
society, its gradual dissolution under capitalism, and its culmination under communism.7 
Moreover, the dissolution ushered in by capitalism is posited as necessary for moving 
beyond “feudal idiocy” and parochialism.8 As part of this process, large scale enclosures, 
privatization of the means of production and the separation of men from their means of 
subsistence (their “radical chains”), all conspire towards the establishment of a class-
divided society based on a capitalist division of social labor. In that society, the dominant 
form of relationship between human beings is one of “mutual indifference”. Marx does 
not deny that capitalism exhibits a certain form of reciprocity. Indeed, the market form of 
reciprocity is, he says, a “natural precondition of exchange” (Marx 1973, 244). But that is 
not the rich form of reciprocity Marx envisages for communism:9 
 
[Market] reciprocity interests [the subject to an exchange] only in so far as it 
satisfies his interest to the exclusion of, without reference to, that of the other. 
That is, the common interest which appears as the motive of the whole is 
recognised as a fact by both sides; but, as such, it is not the motive, but rather 
it proceeds, as it were, behind the back of these self-reflected particular 
                                                 
6Cohen labels his intuitionist approach to doing philosophy, in which “individual judgments retain a 
certain sovereignty”, the “Oxford”, as opposed to the “Harvard”, way (Cohen 2008, 3-4). 
7 For Marx’s characterization of community under communism, see, for example, Marx and Engels (1975, 
vol. 3, 293-306), Marx (1986, 32), Marx (1973, ‘the Chapter on Money”).  
8 See, for example Marx and Engels (1975, vol. 12, 126). For an influential argument defending Marx’s 
“dialectic of labor” along these lines, see Cohen (1974). 
9 I am here grateful to Keat (1981). 
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interests, behind the back of one individual’s interest in opposition to that of 
the other. (Marx 1973, 244) 
 
The reciprocity congealed in exchange relationships is said by Marx to have an 
“abstract universality” (Marx and Engels 1975, 28, pp. 40-41). It is a vehicle for the 
creation, and satisfaction, of more and richer human needs, a process which releases 
humanity from the limited and parochial relationships of feudalism. The abstract 
universality of capitalist exchange relationships is transcended under communist 
production, where free cooperative labor forms the basis of “truly human” relationships, 
i.e. relationships in which “man’s need has become a human need” and where, “the other 
person as a person has become for him a need.” (Marx 1986) Crucially, Marx does not 
infer that communist social relationships will be dominated by altruism or love: “the 
individuals’ consciousness of their mutual relations will, of course… no more be the 
‘principle of love’ or dévouement than it will be egoism.” (Marx and Engels 1975, 5, 439) 
As we shall see in sections III and IV, Cohen’s work in normative political 
philosophy echoes this tentative understanding of Marx’s communist community. But 
first I want to discuss Cohen’s characterization of Marxian communism. He pictures it as 
follows:  
 
imagine a jazz band in which each player seeks his own fulfilment as a 
musician. Though basically interested in his own fulfilment, and not in that of 
the band as a whole, or of his fellow musicians taken severally, he nevertheless 
fulfils himself only to the extent that each of the others also does so, and the 
same holds for each of them. There are, additionally, some less talented 
people around who obtain high satisfaction not from playing but from 
listening, and their presence further enhances the fulfilment of the band’s 
members. (Cohen 1995, 122) 
 
Here’s his explanation of the analogy: 
 
[A]s I understand Marx’s communism, it is a concert of mutually supporting 
self-fulfilments, in which no one takes promoting the fulfilment of others as 
any kind of obligation. I am not, of course, denying that each delights in the 
fulfilment of others. Unless they are crabby people, they probably do so. But 
no such delight is required: it is not something in the dimension of affect 
which is supposed to make communism possible. (Cohen 1995, 123) 
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The emphasis on free, spontaneous, cooperative activity, largely in the absence of 
categorical interpersonal obligations, makes the jazz band analogy particularly apt.10 In a 
“well-ordered” jazz band improvisation takes place such that all members realize to the 
full their capacities and talents: each band member leads, and is in turn led, by the others. 
The emphasis is therefore not on altruism or duty, but rather on the development of free 
individuality: “Each joins [the band] to fulfil himself, and not because he wants it to 
flourish for any independent reason.” (Cohen 1995, 137) 
Now a question immediately arises: how is it possible that everyone can partake of 
this “concert of mutually supporting self-fulfilments” in a world where the 
“circumstances of justice”, i.e. non-unlimited abundance and non-unlimited altruism, 
obtain? How can Marxian communism, in other words, avoid the “struggle for 
necessities”, the concomitant “generalised want” and that “old filthy business” which 
characterizes class-divided societies (Marx and Engels 1975, 5, 48)? Cohen interprets 
Marx as saying that, under communism, the circumstances of justice no longer obtain: 
 
[I]n Marx’s good society, productive resources are available, gratis, to all, but 
the individual remains effectively sovereign over himself… An overflowing 
abundance renders it unnecessary to press the talent of the naturally better 
endowed into the service of the poorly endowed for the sake of establishing 
equality of condition… (Cohen 1995, 122)11 
 
It is Marxian optimism about communist abundance that makes possible “truly 
human”, “mutual indifference”-transcending, relationships that Marx favors (in the 
absence of a massive change in human attitudes, which Marx disavows).12 Cohen rejects 
this optimism about resource abundance (Cohen 1978, 207, Cohen 1995, 5-12, 118-131, 
135). He argues that it must be replaced by “voluntary equality”, i.e. equality of condition 
motivated by widespread social and individual commitment to that value (see below). 
                                                 
10 It lends itself to an “Aristotelian”, rather than “Kantian”, reading of Marxian communism, where the 
former places emphasis on individual self-realization, and the latter on self-realization-independent moral 
obligation. To the extent that the Aristotelian reading of communism is too optimistic about material 
possibility, and therefore about the feasibility of the form of society it envisages, it must either be 
significantly revised, or wholly abandoned, in favour of the Kantian one. Cohen takes the Kantian route in 
his normative political philosophy. 
11 Cohen argues that a commitment to this sort of Star Trek superabundance also explains the “life’s prime 
want” passage in Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Programme (Marx 1986). See Cohen (1995, 124-127) and 
Cohen (1978, 204-207). 
12“It was because he was so uncompromisingly pessimistic about the social consequences of anything less 
that limitless abundance that Marx needed to be so optimistic about the possibility of that abundance.” 
(Cohen 1995, 11) 
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Although Cohen rejects the jazz band conception of communism,13 he does take on 
board Marx’s critique of the distinction between the droits de l’homme and the droits du 
citoyen: 
 
Above all, we note the fact that the so-called rights of man, the droits de 
l’homme as distinct from the droits du citoyen, are nothing but the rights of a 
member of civil society – i.e., the rights of egoistic man, of man separated from 
other men and from the community… Only when the real, individual man 
re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as an individual human being 
has become a species-being in his everyday life, in his particular work, and in 
his particular situation, only when man has recognized and organized his 
‘own powers’ as social powers, and, consequently, no longer separates social 
power from himself in the shape of political power, only then will human 
emancipation have been accomplished. (Marx and Engels 1975, 3, 168) 
 
Marx’s complaint entails that “political emancipation” preserves, indeed implies, 
the insulation of one area of life, civil society, from democratic accountability and 
control.14 As we shall see, Cohen gives a new expression to this complaint against 
liberalism through a comprehensive attack on its most prominent contemporary 
defender, John Rawls. Cohen’s attack, if successful, afflicts not only liberals, but all 
defenders of markets.15 
 
Community and Liberalism 
 
Cohen came to political philosophy through a critique of Robert Nozick’s political 
philosophy (see Cohen 1995). It was Nozick’s work that “roused [him] from what had 
been [his] dogmatic socialist slumber.” (Cohen 1995, 4) Having thus tread the path from 
historical materialism to normative political philosophy, Cohen inevitably had to face up 
to the massive edifice of Rawlsian liberalism.16 
According to Rawls, the primary subject of social justice is the “basic structure” of 
society, a set of institutions including its constitution, legal system, the family, and so on. 
                                                 
13 He deems it necessary to note that, for Marx, community is “a means to the independently specified goal 
of the development of each person’s powers.” (Cohen 1995, 123, emphasis in original) To the extent that 
Cohen here ascribes to Marx an instrumental view of (the value of) community, Cohen’s own account of 
community is at odds with this ascription. For, as we shall see, Cohen thought community to have intrinsic 
value. 
14 See (Marx and Engels 1975, 3, 154) for Marx’s distinction between the “communal” being of political 
community and the “profane” being of civil society. 
15 I postpone the task of clarifying the term “market” for section IV. 
16  For a telling passage explaining his enamourment to Rawls’ moral philosophy, see Cohen (2008, 11). 
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Rawls argues that a “well-ordered” society must regulate its basic structure to conform 
with his two principles of justice, as they are derived from an “original position” of free 
and equal rational choosers.17 Rawls derives his favored principle of distribution, the so-
called difference principle, by invoking the device of the original position. According to 
the difference principle “social and economic inequalities are to… be to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged members of society” (Rawls 1999, 72) Between 1992 and 
2009, Cohen largely occupied himself with criticizing the conclusions Rawls draws from 
the device of the original position and, eventually, with attacking the “constructivist” 
reading of that position itself. (Cohen 2008, Feltham 2009) One of those conclusions was 
Rawls’ view that the difference principle represents a plausible 
 
interpretation of the principle of fraternity… The difference principle… does 
seem to correspond to a natural meaning of fraternity: namely, to the idea of 
not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of others 
who are less well off… Those better circumstanced are willing to have their 
greater advantages only under a scheme in which this works out of the benefit 
of the less fortunate. (Rawls 1999, 90) 
 
Cohen’s strategy consists in pointing out a series of central ambiguities in Rawls’ 
“basic structural” reading of the subject of justice, and in his understanding of 
community. Cohen’s argument has, roughly, two steps. He sets out by showing that there 
exist certain individual choices which fall under the purview of social justice and which 
Rawls cannot exclude, on pain of arbitrariness. He then argues that, were a case to be 
made that these individual choices manifest Rawlsian fraternity, then that fraternity 
would be too ‘thin” to merit the name. If these two steps are successful, then Cohen will 
have shown that the most influential contemporary defence of liberalism is inadequate on 
at least one ground, that of community. The rest of this section discusses Cohen’s two 
steps. 
The first step in Cohen’s argument involves an immanent critique of Rawls’ “basic 
structure restriction”.18 This critique is indispensable to Cohen’s project, for community 
applies irreducibly to relations between individuals, rather than relations between 
structures. Cohen confronts Rawls with a dilemma: either the basic structure, the 
“primary subject of justice”, does include personal behavior, or it does not. If it does not 
include personal behavior, then its specification is purely arbitrary. If it does include 
personal behavior, then it fails to exclude what Rawls (and other liberals) wish it to 
exclude, namely personal behavior. Let’s examine each horn of the dilemma more closely. 
                                                 
17For an introduction to Rawls’ work, see Pogge (2007). 
18This critique was first published in a 1997 essay, entitled “Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive 
Justice”, reappearing as chapter 3 in Cohen (2008). 
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On the first horn, Rawls circumscribes his subject of justice by saying that it is only the 
major institutions of society that have a direct and profound bearing on the distribution 
of benefits and burdens among citizens. Thus it is only those institutions that come under 
the purview of justice. Cohen’s argument is that there is nothing about personal behavior 
within major institutions to rule out the possibility of oppression, exploitation and 
injustice supervening on such behavior alone. So the basic structure of society must 
include more than these institutions. On the second horn of the dilemma, Rawls can put 
forward an expansive account of the basic structure, such that it includes personal 
behavior. But that, Cohen argues, makes him into: 
 
a radical egalitarian socialist, whose outlook is very different from that of a 
liberal who holds that “deep inequalities” are “inevitable in the basic structure 
of any society”. (Cohen 2008, 129)19 
 
For Cohen, a “radical egalitarian socialist” is someone who believes that equality 
applies not only to structures, but also to individual behavior. Radical egalitarian 
socialists ought to support the feminist slogan “the personal is political” because they are 
radical socialists, and endow that slogan with egalitarian content (through what Cohen 
calls an “egalitarian ethos”), because they are egalitarians.  
This completes the first step in Cohen’s attempt to “out-Kant” Rawls: social justice 
does not exempt personal behavior from the demands of justification. The second step 
requires him to show that certain forms of personal behavior, which do call for 
justification, cannot meet the demands of a community worth its salt. The form of 
personal behavior that exercises Cohen is that of talented incentive-seekers. He argues 
that there exists no compelling “I-thou” Rawlsian justification that the talented can offer 
to the nontalented for benefiting from market-generated inequalities (such as: “the 
inequality between you and me was necessary to make you better off”).20 The inability of 
the talented to offer this sort of justification turns on an ambiguity as to what “necessity” 
consists in. Given the centrality of this démarche for Cohen’s account of community, I 
propose to study it at some length. 
In his Tanner lectures, entitled “Incentives, Inequality and Community”,21 Cohen 
attacks Rawlsian liberalism for its tolerance of inequality (in the relevant metric). The 
attack takes two general forms. As in his basic structure critique, Cohen insists that, since 
                                                 
19The first horn of the dilemma has been defended by Joshua Cohen (2001) and the second horn by Estlund 
(1998). Cohen responds to both in Cohen (2008, 374-394). Andrew Williams is the only author I know who 
has argued that the dilemma is not exhaustive. See Cohen (2008, chapter 8) for a response to Williams. 
20 By ‘the talented” Cohen means all those “fortunate people” who are “so positioned that, happily, for them, 
they do command a high salary and they can vary their productivity according to exactly how high it is.” 
(Cohen 2008, 120) 
21 Reprinted as the first chapter of Cohen (2008). 
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justice judges personal behavior, and since the talented in Rawlsian society will get more 
than the nontalented, Rawlsian liberals are committed to “giving to those who have”. 
(Cohen 2008, 86)22 What, then, can justify the fact that the talented will fail, in a Rawlsian 
society, to contribute, say, the same amount of work at a higher rate of taxation for the 
benefit of the nontalented less well-off? According to Cohen, such behavior is normally 
unjust. “Normally” is of importance here: a refusal to work the same amount of hours at a 
higher tax rate (or more hours at the same tax rate) can be caused by an agent’s 
unwillingness to work longer hours, or by the practical impossibility of doing so without 
impugning one’s own life projects.23 That is, sometimes the talented can’t produce the 
same at a higher tax rate, and that’s a perfect excuse, indeed a justification, for not so 
producing. But sometimes they won’t produce the same at a higher tax rate.  
To the distinction between “can’t” and “won’t” there correspond, roughly, two 
readings of the difference principle. The strict reading of the difference principle “counts 
inequalities as necessary only when they are, strictly, necessary, that is, apart from 
people’s chosen intentions.” The lax reading, on the other hand, “countenances intention-
relative necessities as well. So, for example, if an inequality is needed to make the badly 
off better off but only given that talented producers operate as self-interested market 
maximizers, then that inequality is endorsed by the lax, but not by the strict, reading of 
the difference principle.” (Cohen 2008, 69) If the lax difference principle entails “giving to 
those who have”, then we should favor the strict difference principle on justice grounds. 
But Cohen also develops a (justice-independent) argument in favor of the strict 
difference principle, on community grounds. I discuss this presently. 
 
 
Community against Liberalism 
 
Cohen’s community-based argument for the strict difference principle goes as follows: 
 
I believe that the idea that an inequality is justified if, through the familiar 
incentive mechanism, it benefits the badly off, is more problematic than 
Rawlsians suppose; that (at least) when the incentive consideration is isolated 
from all reference to desert and entitlement, it generates an argument for 
inequality that requires a model of society in breach of an elementary 
                                                 
22Recall that the original impetus in favor of equality in the formulation of the difference principle issues 
from a belief that the unequalizing effect on distribution of “natural and social contingencies” is unjust. For 
“it permits distributive shares… arbitrary from a moral point of view.” (Rawls 1999, 63) To be talented is 
therefore to be privileged in the offending sense: it is to be so “positioned” or “gifted” as to (be able to) reap 
a higher “distributive share” in a “morally arbitrary” way. 
23 Cohen accepts an “agent-centered prerogative” of individuals to “pursue self-interest to a reasonable 
extent.” (Cohen 2008, 61) 
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condition of community. The difference principle can be used to justify 
paying incentives that induce inequalities only when the attitude of talented 
people runs counter to the spirit of the difference principle itself: they would 
not need special incentives if they were themselves unambivalently 
committed to the principle. Accordingly, they must be thought of as outside 
community upholding the principle when it is used to justify incentive 
payments to them. (Cohen 2008, 32) 
 
Cohen’s conception of community takes as its point of departure the interpersonal test: 
 
This tests how robust a policy argument is by subjecting it to variation with 
respect to who is speaking and/or who is listening when the argument is 
presented. The test asks whether the argument could serve as a justification of 
a mooted policy when uttered by any member of society to any other 
member. (Cohen 2008, 42)24 
 
The interpersonal test in turn furnishes a necessary condition25 for what Cohen 
calls justificatory community: 
 
A justificatory community is a set of people among whom there prevails a 
norm (which need not always be satisfied) of comprehensive justification. If 
what certain people are disposed to do when a policy is in force is part of the 
justification of that policy, it is considered appropriate to ask them to justify 
the relevant behaviour, and it detracts from justificatory community when 
they cannot do so. It follows that an argument for a policy satisfies the 
requirement of justificatory community, with respect to the people it 
mentions, only if it passes the interpersonal test. (Cohen 2008, 42-3) 
 
Justificatory community is then said to “contribute to”, or be “indicative of”, 
community tout court, a moral notion Cohen compares to friendship (Cohen 2008, 43). 
In effect, justificatory community restricts the class of admissible inequality-types to 
those that pass the interpersonal test. Moreover, Cohen claims that this class rules out lax 
specifications of the difference principle. A well-ordered society must therefore affirm 
                                                 
24There are two readings of this test. On the metaethical reading, it expresses an intrinsic property of all 
moral claims as second-personal (Anderson 2010). On the ethical reading, it expresses a substantive moral 
requirement. According to the ethical reading, if P is patently motivated by, say, vileness, and/or has 
committed vile acts, then P cannot (always) justifiably or excusably condemn others of vileness, even if 
what P says is substantively true. See Cohen (2006a) for discussion of the substantive reading. 
25 Though not sufficient: see the “Martian” passage in Cohen (2008, 44). 
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and practice the strict difference principle, thereby enforcing (some measure of) his 
egalitarian ethos. Here’s Cohen’s poignant challenge to Rawls: 
 
Two brothers, A and B, are at benefit levels 6 and 5, respectively, in New 
York, where they live. If they moved to Chicago, their levels would rise to 10 
and 5.1, respectively. If they moved to Boston, they would rise to 8 and 7. Is 
fraternity, as Rawls means to characterize it, consistent with A proposing that 
they move to Chicago? If so, it is a thin thing. Or is Rawlsian fraternity strictly 
maximinizing? (Cohen 2008, 78)26 
 
Why is Rawlsian fraternity a “thin thing”, unless ‘strictly maximinizing”? In 
response to this question, Cohen defends an analogy between a kidnapper and a talented 
egoist. He asks us to imagine a kidnapper directly addressing an ultimatum to the 
kidnapped child’s parents:  
 
Children should be with their parents. 
Unless you pay me, I shall not return your child. 
So you should pay me (Cohen 2008, 39) 
 
The justification given by Rawls for paying higher salaries to the talented is 
analogous in structure: 
 
Economic inequalities are justified when they make the worst off people 
materially better off. (Major premise) 
When the top marginal rate is 40 percent, (a) the talented rich produce more 
than they do when it is 60 percent, and (b) the worst-off are, as a result, 
materially better off. (Minor premise) 
Therefore, the top tax should not be raised above 40 percent to 60 percent. 
(Cohen 2008, 34) 
 
Cohen claims that there is a strong affinity between the two arguments.27 To see 
this, all we have to do is imagine the latter argument articulated by the talented and 
addressed directly to the worse-off nontalented. If we do that, we will observe that both 
the kidnapper and the talented egoist make the minor premise true. That is, the kidnapper 
                                                 
26“Poignant,” because Rawls evokes the image of the family to explain how community is related to the 
difference principle. 
27 He grants, of course, that the behaviour of the kidnapper and the behaviour of the talented egoist are 
disanalogous in many respects (Cohen 2008, 41). But there is one respect, he thinks, in which they are 
analogous, namely in encroaching upon justice and community. 
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makes it true that, if he does not get the money, he will not return the child. Likewise, the 
talented who insist on high salaries or profits make it true that, if they do not get the high 
reward, they will work less hard, to the detriment of the worse-off. The kidnapper’s 
conditional violates community because it fails the interpersonal test: his illocutionary 
acts place him beyond the pale of an embarrassment-free dialogical relationship with the 
child’s parents. (Cohen 2008, 41-46) If the analogy with the talented is valid, and if non-
thin community requires justificatory community, as Cohen claims, then the posture of 
the talented is unacceptable on community grounds. 
I have, so far, tried to sketch Cohen’s two-pronged attack against Rawlsian 
liberalism in the context of a broader argument for an egalitarian ethos (strictly speaking, 
for an intention-inclusive subject of justice). On the first prong, Cohen advances 
intention-inclusion on justice grounds: allowing the talented to be better off than the less 
talented is “giving to those who have”. On the second prong, Cohen advances intention-
inclusion on community grounds, by arguing that in Rawlsian society the dialogical 
relationship between the talented and the untalented can never be embarrassment-free.28 
How are these two grounds in favor of the egalitarian ethos related? I address this 
question presently. 
 
Community and (or against?) Justice 
 
Cohen’s normative political philosophy manifests a deep ambivalence as to the 
connection, and indeed the compossibility, between justice (roughly: equality)29 and 
community (roughly: justificatory community). Consider, first, Cohen’s characterization 
of the kidnapper: 
 
although what is (mainly) bad about the kidnapper is not his voicing the 
argument, but his making its minor premise true, he should still be ashamed 
to voice the argument, just because he makes that premise true. The fact that 
in some cases he would do further ill not to voice the argument does not 
falsify the claim that in all cases he reveals himself to be ghastly when he does 
voice it. (Cohen 2008, 40) 
 
                                                 
28Of all the discussions of Cohen’s critique of incentives I know, only Richard Miller (2010) has noticed that 
the justice grounds and the community grounds for intention-inclusion constitute distinct arguments. The 
reason why many commentators fail to distinguish between them is that Cohen himself is ambiguous as to 
the exact relationship between justice and community. 
29Cohen did not accept the difference principle as the best conception of (distributive) justice. He defended 
an alternative theory that came to be called luck egalitarianism (Cohen 1989, 2004). Luck egalitarianism is 
founded on the intuition that it is morally bad, because unfair, if A is worse off than B through no fault or 
choice of A’s own. 
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This paragraph implicitly distinguishes between makings (of the minor premise 
true) and voicings (of the conditional ransom demand). The supervening dialogical 
relationship between parent and kidnapper clearly puts the kidnapper beyond the pale of 
community. But the passage does not make sufficiently clear whether the making is a 
necessary condition for the voicing being bad, or indeed whether the making is a 
necessary condition for the justifiability or aptness of feeling shame. In other words, we 
are not told whether injustice is a necessary condition for lack of community. Granting 
that both the kidnapper and the talented egoist do injustice, it does not follow that 
injustice is necessary for lack of community. Cohen’s examples do, however, seem to 
gesture in this direction, for they furnish a plausible explanation as to why the voicings 
are wrong. Cohen makes his ambivalence explicit in a short book published a month after 
his death, entitled Why not Socialism? (Cohen 2009). 
 
I am rich, you are poor, because of regrettable bad choices… and not 
therefore because of lack of equality of opportunity. You have to ride the 
crowded bus every day, whereas I pass you by in my comfortable car. One 
day, however, I must take the bus, because my wife needs the car. I can 
reasonably complain about that to a fellow car-driver, but not to you. I can’t 
say to you: “It’s awful that I have to take the bus today.” There’s a lack of 
community between us of just the sort that naturally obtains between me and 
the fellow car driver… I believe that certain inequalities that cannot be 
forbidden in the name of socialist equality of opportunity should nevertheless 
be forbidden in the name of community. But is it an injustice to forbid the 
transactions that generate those inequalities? Do the relevant prohibitions 
merely define the terms within which justice will operate, or do they 
sometimes (justifiably?) contradict justice? I do not know the answer to that 
question (Cohen 2009, 35-6, emphasis added, see also Cohen 1989).  
 
Cohen is here asking not whether justice (sometimes) conflicts with community. 
Rather the question is: given that –Cohen’s conception of– distributive justice will 
sometimes produce conflicts between the realization of that justice and the realization of 
community,30 is it unjust to forbid the transaction-types that generate this conflict? The 
example Cohen gives is of a lottery, in which all can (freely) enter, starting from a state of 
equality. The lottery generates massive inequalities of condition, which are inapposite to 
embarrassment-free dialogical relationships: “even though there is no injustice here, your 
                                                 
30Cohen refers explicitly to a “trade-off between fraternity and fairness” in Cohen (2006b, 443). Anderson 
(2010, 5-6) is, however, mistaken in her judgment that Cohen’s fraternity critique of incentives requires a 
luck egalitarian premise, i.e. a premise embodying Cohen’s own theory of fairness. For that critique is 
immanent, i.e. goes through even on the assumption that justice requires some sort of difference principle. 
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luck cuts you off from our common life, and the ideal of community condemns that, and 
therefore also condemns the running of any such lottery.” (Cohen 2009, 38) 
The putative conflict runs yet deeper than Cohen envisages. Let’s assume, plausibly, 
that the idea of community at work in the passage above is, or partakes of, justificatory 
community.31 Cohen’s rationale for introducing this particular account of community is 
that not doing so permits too much inequality (and perhaps that community has intrinsic 
value). Now, both the talented egoist case and the bus case involve too much inequality. 
Of course the former case is unlike the latter, in that the talented egoist is, by assumption, 
benefiting from injustice, whereas the car driver on the bus is not. But both cases are said 
to involve transgressions of community. Why, then, dismiss the theory of justice that 
endorses incentive-seeking, but retain the theory of justice that endorses inequality in car-
ownership? In other words, if justificatory community suffices to defeat Rawlsian justice, 
because that justice supports community-diminishing inequality, why does it not also 
suffice to defeat Cohenite justice, instead of (merely) making that justice “contradict” 
community? Cohen’s argument against Rawls seems to afflict his own account, like a fox 
that bites its own tail. Cohen can respond in two ways. He can say that the form of 
community tentatively broached in Why not Socialism? does not imply justificatory 
community. Alternatively, he can insist that his original, anti-Rawls argument was purely 
immanent, and he himself does not accept justificatory community. Both responses 
purchase consistency at the cost of emptiness, for each leaves us in the dark as to what 
Cohen actually thinks about community.32  
I now want to argue that a certain division of moral labour underlies Cohen’s 
commitments to justice and community, such that justice is concerned primarily with 
outcomes, whereas community is concerned primarily with individual motivation. With 
respect to the role of the egalitarian ethos for justice, Cohen writes: 
 
Under abnormal conditions, justice might be consistent with universal self-
interested maximising: if, for example, talents and utility functions are 
identical, then initial equality of tangible assets might be considered sufficient 
for justice. (Cohen 2008, 73, emphasis added)  
 
It follows that, in the possible world in which self-interested maximizers get 
universal equality, justice is fully done. It is, of course, very unlikely that this possible 
world will become actual, but the modal claim shows that Cohen is a consequentialist 
                                                 
31 There is strong textual evidence that Cohen views the lack of justificatory togetherness in the bus case and 
the incentives case as relevantly similar (compare Cohen (2008, 45) and Cohen (2009, 36)) 
32In light of all these difficulties, perhaps Cohen is better off giving up luck egalitarianism –his own theory 
of justice. Cohen was, in fact, flirting with rejecting, or at least significantly revising, luck egalitarianism 
towards the end of his life. See Cohen (2011, 124-147) for Cohen’s doubts about his own view and Vrousalis 
(forthcoming) for an argument that these doubts were well-founded. 
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about justice. Consequentialism about justice asserts that justice evaluates only states of 
the world, viz. distributions, independently of the motivation or standing of the agents 
that bring them about.33 That Cohen asserts consequentialism about justice can be more 
clearly corroborated from a passage that discusses James Meade’s social-democratic 
model: 
 
Suppose that all citizens have the same tastes and talents, or at any rate that 
no differences among their tastes and talents would prevent an initial state-
enforced equality of resources from reproducing itself under subsequent 
market-maximizing behaviour. Here the Meadian prescription [of people 
acting altruistically at the ballot box, but selfishly in their everyday lives] 
would be sound, from a purely egalitarian point of view (as opposed to from 
the point of view of an egalitarianism enriched by a principle of community). 
But the required conditions will never obtain. Selfish market behaviour will 
induce inequality of reward, and state intervention could mitigate but not 
(consistently with efficiency) reverse that tendency. (Cohen 2008, 175, 
emphasis added)  
 
Since the Meadian prescription is “sound”, consequentialism about justice is true. 
But the same passage confirms that Cohen rejects consequentialism about community. 
For the italicized fragment implies that “the principle of community” judges more than 
person-independent states of the world.34  
Cohen’s “somewhat concocted” notion of justificatory community is very 
promising, but turns out to be in tension with his own theory of justice.35 I now want to 
discuss yet another important notion in Cohen’s normative thought, that of communal 
reciprocity. 
 
Fear, Greed and Commodification 
 
Cohen holds that markets (in a sense to be made clear presently) are inapposite to 
justice and community. He argues this on justice grounds in his two essays on luck 
egalitarianism (Cohen 1989, 2004), but I believe his normative political philosophy has to 
                                                 
33 Consequentialism seems to be at odds with Cohen’s claim that “justice in citizens was put, above, as a 
necessary condition of a just society.” (Cohen 2008, 129) I believe much emphasis needs to be placed on 
“was put”, since Cohen’s argument, in this context, is purely immanent. 
34For further discussion of the significance of motivation, see Cohen’s discussion of kidney donation and 
prostitution, where the “the wanted thing is yielded for the wrong reason”. (Cohen 2008, 223-5) 
35 He also does not say what the relevant class of actions falling under justificatory community is. Cohen’s 
argument against the basic structure restriction entails that this class is much broader than liberals are 
inclined to think, but we are left in the dark as to how much broader.  
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be read in light of this belief.36 Cohen (2009) develops an anti-market argument on 
grounds of community by enlisting two “modes of communal caring”.37 The “first mode” 
is something like justificatory community, and is illustrated by the bus case (see p. 14 
above). The “second mode”, dubbed “communal reciprocity” is: 
 
...the antimarket principle according to which I serve you not because of what 
I can get in return by doing so but because you need or want my service, and 
you, for the same reason, serve me. Communal reciprocity is not the same 
thing as market reciprocity, since the market motivates productive 
contribution not on the basis of commitment to one’s fellow human beings 
and a desire to serve them while being served by them, but on the basis of 
cash reward. The immediate motive to productive activity in a market society 
is (not always but) typically some mixture of greed and fear, in proportions 
that vary with the details of a person’s market position and personal 
character… the market posture is greedy and fearful in that one’s opposite-
number marketers are predominantly seen as possible sources of enrichment, 
and as threats to one’s success. (Cohen 2009, 38-41)  
 
Why not Socialism? is full of passages reminiscent of Marx’s critique of market 
society: the “abstract”, but “selfish” form of market reciprocity, the alienation of producer 
from consumer and product, the semblance of independence “founded on dependence”, 
and so on. By contrast, in a society where human relationships are regulated by 
communal reciprocity, people can properly be said to constitute each other’s need, and 
the emphasis is not just on how they fare, but also on how they approach and treat one 
another. Fear and greed thus cease to be the dominant motives in their everyday lives and 
are replaced by dialogically acceptable mutual concern. 
Liberals (of Rawlsian and non-Rawlsian persuasions) object to this identification of 
market motivation with motivation by fear and greed. Jeremy Shearmur, for example, 
discusses “mixed motive” systems in connection with the market for blood, adding that 
“there seems to be no special reason to insist on austerely altruistic motives here” 
(Shearmur 2003, 264-5). Drawing upon Andrew Carnegie’s life, Hillel Steiner also argues 
that neither fear, nor greed are necessary elements “in the motivational explanation of 
market behaviour.” (Steiner forthcoming, 9)  
The liberal objection confuses different senses of the term “market”. As I 
understand that term, there are two kinds of markets. The first kind is innocuous, the 
second is devilish. An innocuous market system is what may be called small-scale 
commodity production: a network of markets, where people bring their privately owned 
                                                 
36 I argue this in Vrousalis (2010). 
37 Cohen does not say how these two modes are related or, indeed, whether they are consistent. 
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wares for trade, to the exclusion of a labour market.38 Injustice or lack of community may 
supervene under small-scale commodity production, but that social formation is not 
intrinsically unjust or unfraternal, and can be regulated to produce both justice and 
community. A non-innocuous market system is what Marxists call generalized commodity 
production: a network of markets, where people bring their privately owned wares for 
trade, and which includes a labour market. Indeed, what distinguishes capitalist from pre-
capitalist modes of production is that, under the former, and unlike the latter, capital has 
invaded the sphere of production, and turned labour power into a commodity.39  
I maintain that the distinction between different forms of commodification sheds 
light on Cohen’s remarks about community, and therefore on his opposition to the sort of 
“handling” that capitalism (regulated or not) generates: 
 
The capitalist market does not, of course, require people to handle people 
roughly, but… the market does require people to handle people, to manage 
them, in a particular sense. Business is, among other things, people treating 
people according to a market norm –the norm that says they are to be 
dispensed with if they cannot produce at a rate which satisfies market 
demand… Business turns human producers into commodities. (Cohen 2000, 
181)  
 
The distinction shows, I think, how wrongheaded the liberal “mixed motives” 
response is. The capitalist market, qua generalized commodity production, by definition 
involves treating humans like commodities. Moreover, commodification must perforce 
institutionalize fear and greed, for otherwise it cannot perform its functional role. It 
institutionalizes fear because the owner of labour power (who does not own means of 
production) will always be under (the threat of) unemployment, poverty, alienation, 
misery, and so on.40 It institutionalizes greed because no owner of the means of 
production can maximize his profit without maximally exploiting (in both the ethically 
neutral, and the non-neutral, sense) his workers. To be sure, not all market relationships 
constitute institutionalizations of instrumental treatment of others, as small-scale 
commodity relations demonstrate (e.g. my relation to the local grocer). Furthermore, no 
moral complications need arise with commodification if I get my wealthy neighbour’s 
child to help me move my sofa in return for some pocket money. Commodification is 
                                                 
38 This is, roughly, what Marxists (not Marx) call ‘simple commodity production”. 
39What distinguishes capitalism from pre-capitalism is therefore neither private property, nor the profit 
motive, nor the existence of capital: all of the above pre-date capitalism and are necessary, but not sufficient 
for capitalist production. It is the generalization of commodity production that completes the set of 
sufficient conditions. 
40 For a more dramatic description of the evils of commodification, see Marx (1992, 799) 
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objectionable if and when it embodies or implies some sort of domination, i.e. the 
instrumental treatment of others through power over them.41 
A rough and ready liberal response to this argument may grant that capitalists, qua 
capitalists, must behave with greed, and that workers, qua workers, must behave with fear 
under the structural constraints capitalism imposes. But one may then respond that there 
exist systems of market socialism that very nearly eliminate the suspect forms of 
motivation, or render them morally negligible. One such form of market socialism has 
been defended by Joseph Carens. Cohen was sympathetic to the Carensian model, which 
he called the “Platonic ideal of market socialism.” (Cohen 1995, 264) Here’s his 
characterization of that ideal: 
 
Carens described a society in which what looks like a standard capitalist 
market organizes economic activity, but the tax system cancels the 
disequalizing results of that market by redistributing income to complete 
equality. There are (pretax) profit-seeking capitalists, and workers who own 
no capital, but people acknowledge an obligation to serve others, and the 
extent to which they discharge that obligation is measured by how close their 
pretax income is to what would be in the most remunerative (and therefore, 
on standard assumptions, the most socially contributing) activity available to 
them, which taxation effects a fully egalitarian posttax distribution of income. 
Here, then, producers aim, in an immediate sense, at cash results, but they do 
not keep (or otherwise benefit from) the money that accrues, and they seek it 
out of a desire to contribute to society: a market mechanism is used to solve 
the social technology problem, in the service of equality and community. 
(Cohen 2009, 63-64)  
 
The Carensian ideal is “Platonic” because, unlike other forms of market socialism, it 
makes sufficient space for eliminating objectionable inequality in both alienable and 
inalienable resources.42 But even if superior to other forms of market socialism, it is still 
                                                 
41 I discuss this, and related questions, in “Why Marxists Should be Interested in Exploitation”, which is 
available from me upon request. 
42 Important models of market socialism have recently been drawn up by Roemer (1994) and Schweickart 
(1996). Both Roemerian socialism, which equalizes individual shares to the means of production, and 
Schweickartian socialism, which gives all members of workers’ cooperatives an equal say over the 
management of the means of production imply (more or less) equalization of alienable resources. But what 
happens if, say, the more talented members of a cooperative down the road consistently make more money 
than others? Schweickart, unlike Cohen (and unlike Roemer), takes the resulting inequality to be not 
unjust. Yet the resulting inequality of resources and power is hardly congenial to Schweickartian economic 
democracy. Carensian market socialism can address that form of inequality and is, in that respect, more 
attractive. 
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inferior to a system of “planned mutual giving” (Cohen 2009, 10), such as the planned 
giving of a “well-ordered” camping trip. The reason some inferiority remains even under 
Carensian socialism is that it fails to meet Cohen’s standard of communal reciprocity. To 
see this, consider what Carens requires of the typical capitalist: in the morning he goes to 
work, and treats others exclusively as sources of enrichment, fires and hires them, and so 
on. The typical worker, on the other hand, views the capitalist, and his fellow workers, as 
constant threats to his own autonomy and self-respect.43 In the afternoon the capitalist 
and the worker join hands, and return home together to enjoy their high –and equal- 
levels of material wealth. In the afternoon they “storm heaven”, but in the morning they 
must reluctantly take their chances in a profane world. The scent of bourgeois 
schizophrenia is in the air.44 
But what’s wrong with schizophrenia?45 I say nothing about schizophrenia in 
general, but the bourgeois schizophrenia defended by market socialists is morally 
problematic, or, at least, it must be for someone (like Cohen), who affirms the value of 
community. For the relevant analogy is surely with someone who kidnaps your child in 
the morning and returns it (with some added benefit) in the afternoon. Market socialism, 
even Carensian market socialism, is generalized, self-reproducing kidnapping, in the 
sense that both the victims of kidnapping and the victims of the market (in the non-
innocuous sense of “market”) are dominated: only a handful of workers are ever given a 
reasonable exit option from the sort of institutionalized relationship that breeds fear 
and/or greed, in which their lives are embedded are reproduced.46  
To be sure, under Carensian socialism, market domination results in substantial net 
benefits for the receivers of post-tax redistribution (whereas in the case of kidnapping the 
domination typically results in net harm for parents and child).47 But this does not detract 
from the inherently objectionable features of the relationship in which market agents are 
embedded, at least during their working lives, including the tendency of this relationship 
to generate yet another “nursery for those vices of character” which include servility and 
                                                 
43 He proceeds cautiously, ‘timid and holding back, like one who is bringing his own hide to market and has 
nothing to expect but –a tanning.” (Marx 1992, 280) Threats to one’s self-respect survive even if he is 
guaranteed to earn as much as others do, or indeed to fare as well as they do. 
44Interestingly, one of Hayek’s (1944) arguments for capitalism is the depoliticization it effects, i.e. its 
distancing of politics from the economy. This feature is, in turn, said to “protect” democracy. For a rebuttal 
of Hayek, see Schweickart (1996, 206-224).   
45 This question was put to me by Hillel Steiner in the course of my presentation of this objection. 
46 “The market, one might say, is a casino from which it is difficult to escape...” (Cohen 2009, 33) The 
casino, we may add, is situated on a large boat and enforces a strict policy of fear and greed. Those who fail 
to wear fear and greed on their face during their gambling endeavours are summarily thrown out to sea. 
47  Market domination is not a form of agent-less domination (whatever that is): if the market dominates, 
then some agents are eo ipso dominating others. 
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greed.48 Since communal reciprocity by definition rules out these “vices of character” and 
the structures that generate them, Carensian socialism is inconsistent with communal 
reciprocity. 
Let me summarize the argument of this section. Cohen thought communal 
reciprocity to be a value of “supreme” importance. He also held that value to be 
inconsistent with standard market motivations, such as fear and greed. Liberals counter 
his criticism by arguing that markets are consistent with “mixed motives”, which need 
not involve fear and greed (or, at any rate, their morally suspect forms). To this I have 
responded, on Cohen’s behalf, that whatever motives people happen to (want to) have, 
once we properly disambiguate the term “market” we will come to see why the capitalist 
market has an intrinsic tendency to generate fear and greed. The liberal rejoinder says 
that elimination or minimization of fear and greed is possible under a system of market 
socialism (e.g. resembling Carens’ model). To this I have replied that even such a system 
will fail to meet Cohen’s standards of communal reciprocity, since (Carensian) market 
socialism upholds the liberal distinction between “earthly” and “heavenly” aspects of the 
social world, in a way that imposes forms of domination on (a part of) peoples’ lives. I 
conclude that full realization of communal reciprocity requires the abolition of such 
relationships. It requires, in a nutshell, the decommodification of human labour power: 
decommodification is necessary for community.49 I do not, of course, pretend that this is 
exactly what Cohen thought. All I have said is that communal reciprocity sets high 
standards, that these standards can’t possibly be met when people are treated as 
commodities (not even for eight hours a day), that all market-based societies (whether 
capitalist or market socialist) thus fail to embrace those standards, and that Cohen never 
balked at this conclusion. Indeed, he wholeheartedly embraced it.  
This essay has sketched and critically assessed Cohen’s account of community. His 
work can, I think, shed fresh light on this neglected, but very important, value. The 
distinctive moral significance of socialism, and its capacity to represent itself as distinct 
from liberal egalitarianism, may yet hinge upon the understanding and prominence 
socialists attach to that value. 
                                                 
48 I am paraphrasing Mill (1869, 66), who is here describing the relation of “superiors to dependents” in the 
context of the traditional family. His description nevertheless applies as much to ancient slavery, as to the 
contemporary wage relation. 
49Cohen dismissed the view that decommodification is sufficient for communal reciprocity. Section IV of 
Why not Socialism? is devoted to the question whether it would be possible, using a form of social 
technology morally superior to that of the market, to produce a reasonably efficient and egalitarian 
economy on the basis of communal reciprocity. His answer is that we do not know whether such a 
technology will ever be forthcoming, which has the -only slightly encouraging- consequence that it is false 
that we now know that such a technology will never be forthcoming. And, because “every market, even a 
socialist market, is a system of predation”, it follows that we should not give up on “our attempt to go 
beyond predation” (Cohen 2009, 82). 
160
 VROUSALIS: Jazz Bands, Camping Trips and Decommodification 
 
 
References 
 
Anderson, E., “Cohen, Justice and Interpersonal Justification,” Mimeo (2010), 
 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1642011 
 
Brudney, D., Marx’s Attempt to Leave Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
 University Press, 1998). 
 
Cohen, G.A., “Marx’s Dialectic of Labour,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 3 (1974): 
 235-261. 
 
Cohen, G.A., Karl Marx’s theory of history: A defence (Princeton: Princeton 
 University Press, 1978). 
 
Cohen, G.A., History, labour, and freedom. (Oxford: Oxford University Press,  1988). 
 
Cohen, G.A., “On the currency of egalitarian justice,” Ethics 99 (1989): 906–944. 
 
Cohen, G.A., Self-ownership, freedom and equality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 1995). 
 
Cohen, G.A., If you’re an egalitarian, how come you’re so rich? (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press, 2000). 
 
Cohen, G.A., “Expensive taste rides again” in Dworkin and his critics, ed. Justine  Burley 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). 
 
Cohen, G.A., “Casting the first stone: Who can, and who can’t, condemn the 
 terrorists?” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 58 (2006a): 113-136. 
 
Cohen, G.A., “Luck and Equality: A Reply to Hurley,” Philosophy and 
 Phenomenological Research 72 (2006b): 439-446. 
 
Cohen, G.A., Rescuing justice and equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University  Press, 
2008). 
 
161
Socialist Studies / Études socialistes 8 (1) Winter 2012  
Cohen, G.A., On the currency of Egalitarian Justice and other Essays, ed. Michael  Otsuka 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
 
Cohen, J., “Taking People as they Are?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (2001): 363-386. 
 Feltham, B., Justice, Equality and Constructivism: Essays on G. A. Cohen’s  Rescuing 
Justice and Equality (London: Wiley, 2009). 
 Hayek, F., The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,  1944). 
 
Keat, R., “Individualism and Community in Socialist Thought,” in Issues in Marxist 
 Philosophy, vol. 4, ed. J. Mepham, and D.-H. Ruben (Hassocks: Harvester  Press, 
1981). 
 
Leopold, D., The Young Karl Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  2007). 
 
Marx, K., Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973). 
 
Marx, K., Karl Marx: A Reader, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press, 1986). 
 
Marx, K., Capital vol. 1 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics, 1992). 
 
Marx, K. and Engels, F., Collected Works (MECW), vol. 1-50 (New York:  International 
Publishers, 1975-2005). 
 
Mill, J.S., The Subjection of Women (London: Longmans, 1869). 
 
Miller, R., “Relationships of Equality: A Camping Trip Revisited”, Journal of Ethics 
 14 (2010): 231-253. 
 
Pogge, T., John Rawls: His Life and Theory of Justice, trans. Michelle Kosch (Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press, 2007). 
 
Rawls. J., A Theory of Justice, revised edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
 Press, 1999). 
 
Roemer, J., A Future for Socialism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,  1994). 
 
Schweickart. D., Against Capitalism (Colorado: Westview Press, 1996). 
 
162
 VROUSALIS: Jazz Bands, Camping Trips and Decommodification 
Shearmur, J., “Beyond Fear and Greed?” Social Philosophy and Policy 20 (2003):  247-277. 
 
Steiner, H., “Fear and Greed,” Mimeo (forthcoming). 
 
Vrousalis, N., “G.A. Cohen’s Vision of Socialism,” Journal of Ethics 14 (2010): 186-
 216. 
 
Vrousalis, N., “G.A. Cohen on Exploitation,” Mimeo (forthcoming). 
 
Williams, B., “Forward to Basics,” in Equality, ed. Jane Franklin (London: IPPR,  1997). 
 
Wolff, R.P., The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968). 
163
